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This article tackles the multiple facets of visibility, ranging from invisibility, a lack of 
recognition in society, to hypervisibility, when bodies are hyperexposed for 
commodification or criminalization purposes. We analyze the specific implications of 
achieving media visibility for one Black Brazilian woman in politics: Renata Souza, a Rio 
de Janeiro state legislator. Souza’s campaign and mandate have drawn inspiration from 
the legacy of Marielle Franco, a Black lesbian favela-born city councillor and human 
rights advocate who was murdered in March 2018. Our theoretical framework consists of 
three strands of research: visibility studies, intersectional feminism, and intersectional 
work on technologies and surveillance. We draw from autoethnographic approaches with 
the use of field notes, audio diaries, and interviews with members of Souza’s staff. We 
complement these with digital ethnographic observations of Souza’s and her allies’ social 
media profiles. We ask: If visibility is a goal for groups that are marginalized and silenced, 
what happens when they achieve it? When does visibility help to protect Black women? 
And when does visibility bring even greater vulnerability? In this article, we propose and 
define the concept of “link visibility” as a process led by women of color who need a high 
degree of social media publicness but are affected disproportionately by visibility-induced 
high levels of vulnerability. We argue that link visibility represents an intersectional 
feminist approach as well as a tool for solidarity building, and that both—intersectionality 
and link visibility—help bind oppressed realities in Brazil and elsewhere. Finally, we 
interrogate what can be done to protect women of color online, stopping the violence, 
threats, and fear. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marielle Franco was leaving a meeting with Black feminists 
entitled “Black Women Moving Structures” on March 14, 
2018, when her car was ambushed. Franco and her driver, 
Anderson, were shot and killed. The meeting had just been 
transmitted live on her Facebook page. The murder, which 
remains unsolved, sent shock waves across Brazil and 
around the world. Franco was the only Black female city 
councillor in the city of Rio de Janeiro at the time. The 
killing also sent a brutal message: people who experience 
marginalization should not have high dreams and hopes. 
Women who grew up in the favelas should never dare be-
come powerful in politics, as Franco had attempted. 
Franco’s party, the left-wing Socialism and Liberty Party 
(PSOL), decided to lead efforts in launching Black women, 
mostly from working-class backgrounds, to occupy seats 
in state councils and in Congress. They referred to these 
women as the “seeds of Marielle.” Renata Souza, one of the 
authors of this article, decided to overcome her fear and 
move from backstage to the forefront of politics, putting 
her name forward in June 2018. She was elected in October 
2018, becoming a state legislator for Rio de Janeiro. 
In this article, we use these experiences to delve into is-
sues of social media intersectional visibility for Black fe-
male politicians (like Souza) in a tense political context.1 
Brazil represents an interesting case for analysis of the mul-
tiple positive and negative facets of visibility. Since the 
election of President Jair Bolsonaro, many fundamental 
rights have been under attack with an increasing persecu-
tion of social movement leaders, alternative journalists, and 
left-leaning politicians. Additionally, members of the Bol-
sonaro government have adopted a racist and misogynis-
tic rhetoric,2 demeaning women and people of color. At the 
same time, a progressive wave of women—and, particularly, 
The analysis includes trans women as women. The PSOL elected Black trans women in the states of Pernambuco and São Paulo. However, 
this article focuses on the Rio de Janeiro case. 
Some of the widely publicized comments include Bolsonaro stating that he would not rape a colleague (a federal deputy) because she did 
1 
2 
Medrado, Andrea, Renata Souza, and Monique Paulla. 2021. “Black Women in
Parliament and on Social Media: Link Visibility as an Intersectional and Solidarity-
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Black women—in politics has been building strength. Here, 
we draw from autoethnographic approaches with the use 
of data from field notes, audio diaries, and interviews with 
members of Souza’s staff. We complement these with digital 
ethnographic observations of Souza’s and her allies’ Face-
book, Instagram, and Twitter profiles. We ask: as a Black 
female politician, what are Souza’s strategies for achieving 
visibility for her work on traditional and social media? What 
does she do when her visibility translates into vulnerabil-
ity? 
Our theoretical framework consists of three intercon-
nected strands of research: intersectional feminism (Cren-
shaw 1991; Collins 1986), visibility studies (Brighenti 2010; 
Uldam 2017), and intersectional studies of digital technolo-
gies and surveillance (Benjamin 2019; Browne 2015; 
Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2020). Analyzing Souza’s 
navigation through the spectrum of visibility online, we 
suggest that intersectionality, as a theoretical framework 
and political stance, represents a protective, connective 
force. We shed light on instances when intersectional per-
spectives represent tools for building bridges between 
Souza, Black women online, and other social actors, feeding 
into wider struggles against oppression and inequality. We 
argue that intersectional lenses can be adopted for protec-
tive and connective purposes because they prompt us to ac-
quire a deeper understanding of the complexities entailed 
in multiple layers of oppression, such as sexism, racism, and 
elitism, among others. Djamila Ribeiro’s (2017) thoughts on 
“lugar de fala,” or “locus of enunciation,” are useful be-
cause they acknowledge the importance of opening up op-
portunities for marginalized groups to speak. When they 
speak, they create collective “lugares de fala,” or “loci of 
enunciation,” which then lead to solidarity building among 
them, particularly when under attack in toxic digital envi-
ronments. Based on Souza’s and our own experiences of us-
ing social media for political causes, we refer to this phe-
nomenon as link visibility. Drawing on Sasha 
Costanza-Chock’s (Costanza-Chock 2020, 25) work on the 
importance of community control over design justice 
processes, we define link visibility as a process led by women 
of color who need a high degree of social media publicness 
but are affected disproportionately by visibility-induced 
high levels of vulnerability. As we will demonstrate, this 
process creates a connection of the reembodied Black expe-
rience (Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2020) of vulnerabil-
ity online. Such connection can then be utilized as a sur-
vival strategy to ensure that Black women’s existence and 
resistance can remain strong in online spaces. 
USING AUTOETHNOGRAPHY TO ANALYZE THE 
LINK VISIBILITY PROCESSES OF A BLACK 
WOMAN IN POLITICS 
We have chosen a collaborative autoethnographic ap-
proach. This is key in guiding how we develop our theoret-
ical perspectives, present our evidence, and build our argu-
ments. It also allows us to write about our own narratives 
from our classed, raced, gendered, and sexed positionali-
ties, identifying how and why we view the world from our 
lenses. This is also an attempt to offer an alternative to 
what often feels like predominantly white male gazes and 
interpretations (Boylorn and Orbe 2014, 13). The term au-
toethnography refers to both the method and the product 
of researching and writing about personal lived experiences 
and their relationships to the cultural, social, and political 
(Ellis 2004). It involves turning the ethnographic gaze in-
ward on the self (auto) and at the same time keeping an out-
ward gaze, examining the larger context wherein self-expe-
riences take place (Boylorn and Orbe 2014). 
The aim of a collaborative autoethnography is to engage 
multiple authors and perspectives. This requires us to listen 
to each other’s voices, delving into our own assumptions 
and sharpening our collective interpretations. In this way, 
all authors become accountable for the autoethnographic 
process and product (Chang 2013, 111-112). Here, we use 
our personal experiences as primary data, engaging in emo-
tional recall to understand the experiences we have lived 
through (Ellis 1999, 671). Such data consists of ethno-
graphic audio diaries recorded by Renata Souza; field notes 
written by Andrea Medrado; field notes written by Monique 
Paulla; one in-depth interview conducted with Souza by 
Medrado and Paulla; one in-depth interview with Souza’s 
lawyer, Evelyn Melo Silva; and one in-depth interview with 
Marina Iris, Souza’s social media manager. The aim was to 
include Souza’s and her staff’s views on how female politi-
cians can instrumentalize visibility for female tech empow-
erment. Research ethics approval was granted by the Ethics 
Committee at the Federal Fluminense University (via a sub-
mission to the federal government’s Plataforma Brasil). This 
approval required obtaining informed consent from the re-
spondents to use their real names. Whenever we use images 
captured from social media, these come from public pro-
files. The names of people making comments or reacting to 
the posts are omitted. 
Because our research involved collecting data online, it 
also connects to digital ethnographic approaches. Follow-
ing Christine Hine (2015), we highlight the close integra-
tion of digital technologies within our lives. This research 
tradition also acknowledges that anthropological concepts 
and procedures such as “dense description” and “partici-
pant observation” can be successfully applied to studies of 
media consumption and media use by online communities. 
For this article, the data collected included digital ethno-
graphic observations (carried out by Medrado and Paulla) of 
Souza’s Instagram and Twitter profiles (@renatasouzario), 
with 82,600 and 51,100 followers, respectively,3 for one 
month (from 7 May until 7 June 2019). On the first date, Re-
nata denounced the governor of Rio, Wilson Witzel, for hu-
man rights abuses to the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the United Nations (UN), achieving significant 
media visibility in both Brazil and abroad. 
not deserve it. During Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment session, he also paid his respects to a military officer who had tortured her in the 
dictatorship period. 
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We wish to tell this story with our own voices and to have 
control over how we as authors are represented (Alexander 
2014, 111). As two Black and one white4 antiracist Brazilian 
women, we cannot accept our silencing and erasure from 
history, politics, and academia. We are aware that telling 
our story will make us vulnerable to criticism but, as Car-
olyn Ellis (1999) puts it, the vulnerability of revealing one-
self is an integral part of doing an autoethnography. Ques-
tions might arise about how we can protect ourselves 
against our own biases interfering with our observations; 
to respond, we are not claiming neutrality as we embrace 
(auto)ethnography as a situated approach. To quote Ellis, 
we present “one selective story about what happened writ-
ten from a particular point of view at a particular point in 
time for a particular purpose” (1999, 673). We will now dis-
cuss the positionality and role of each author in this article 
in alphabetical order by surname. 
Andrea Medrado was born and raised in a middle-class 
background in Brazil but has lived in countries of the Global 
North, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
When this research was conducted, she was based at the 
Federal Fluminense University, in the city of Niterói, Brazil. 
These experiences have shaped the way in which she sees 
her social world. As a white Brazilian, she has been deeply 
touched by the realities of Black women in favela commu-
nities since the beginning of her research career. She be-
came committed to research that can bring positive social 
change in a context of stark social inequalities. At the same 
time, particularly after spending many years outside Brazil, 
she experienced the challenges of being a Latina, racialized 
as a woman of color in the United Kingdom. She is well 
aware of how media and academic environments can be 
hostile and unfavorable to women of her background. In 
Rio, Medrado met Souza by interviewing her while doing 
fieldwork in 2013. At that time, Souza was a PhD student 
at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Having ice-cold 
beer on the roof of Souza’s house, the two talked about mu-
sic and sounds, the beauty of favela pride, and wearing red 
lipstick. The interview was so moving that Medrado felt un-
comfortable about using Souza’s quotes as those of a re-
search participant. Instead, she decided that Souza should 
become a coauthor of their writings. In 2018, having com-
pleted her PhD, Souza decided to pursue a postdoc position. 
Around the same time, the PSOL proposed that Souza 
should run as a candidate for the state council after Marielle 
Franco was murdered. Medrado still remembers when Souza 
met her at a corner restaurant to communicate these plans. 
Thinking that she wanted her friend alive, Medrado could 
not help it: she advised Souza not to run for political office, 
but Souza did not follow her advice. 
Monique Paulla is a dark-skinned Black woman, born and 
raised in the favela Morro da Mangueira in Rio de Janeiro. 
Her mother was fourteen when she was born. Her biological 
father only recognized her as his daughter when Paulla was 
twelve and he lost a lawsuit. Her student life resembles that 
of Souza. After completing secondary school, she joined 
a community course to prepare for university admission. 
In 2006, as part of the University for All (PROUNI) Pro-
gramme,5 she obtained a full scholarship to study public 
relations at Faculdades Integradas Helio Alonso, a private 
university in Rio. In 2019 she started a master’s degree in 
media and everyday life at the publicly funded Federal Flu-
minense University. Her research focuses on the seeds of 
Marielle Franco and their uses of social media in the politi-
cal landscape. The data gathered for this article is thus part 
of Paulla’s broader research on Black women politicians in 
Brazil. 
Renata Souza was also born in a Rio de Janeiro 
favela—Complexo da Maré. Her father worked as a turner in 
a factory, and her mother was a seamstress in a leather fac-
tory. After completing secondary school, in 2000, she joined 
a course sponsored by the local NGO CEASM (Centro de 
Ações Solidárias da Maré) to prepare for the university en-
trance exam. Three years later, she was admitted into Rio’s 
prestigious private university PUC (Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica) with a full scholarship. Later, she earned a mas-
ter’s and a doctoral degree, both at the Federal University 
of Rio de Janeiro. She juggled her postgraduate studies with 
work at the Human Rights Commission and as a member of 
the communication team for state councillor Marcelo Freixo 
(PSOL) for ten years. In 2016, when Marielle Franco was 
elected as a city councillor, Souza was chosen as her chief 
of staff. Franco’s murder in 2018 drastically changed the 
course of her life: both women were born in Favela da Maré 
and were long-time colleagues and friends. Although the 
fear was overwhelming, with family and friends pleading for 
Souza to stay out of politics, she decided to run for office. 
She was elected with 63,937 votes, making her the left-wing 
politician who received the most votes for this post in the 
state. Having grown up surrounded by fear in the favelas, 
she knew that she had to transform luto (“grieving,” in Por-
tuguese) into luta (“struggle”). 
The need to protect Black women in politics and on so-
cial media drives our research questions. If visibility is a 
goal for groups that are marginalized and silenced, what 
happens when they achieve it? When does visibility help to 
protect Black women? And when does visibility bring even 
greater vulnerability? In this article, we demonstrate how 
intersectional perspectives permeate Souza’s (and indeed 
other Black women politicians’) communication efforts on 
social media. A key element refers to what we are describ-
ing as link visibility, which functions as a tool for solidar-
ity building and protection. Link visibility is a bottom-up 
process to “resist the resurgent extreme right, and also to 
advance concrete proposals for a more just and sustainable 
world” (Costanza-Chock 2020, 23). Here, the concept of link 
As of the time of writing in April 2021. 
The first author is considered white by Brazilian standards. However, she is racialized as a woman of color in countries of the Global 
North, such as the United Kingdom, where she currently lives. 
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visibility fits the wider framework of design justice because 
it entails protection measures led by intersectional femi-
nist networked movements that are increasingly engaged in 
debates on the relationships between technology, surveil-
lance, and social justice (Costanza-Chock 2020, 23). In this 
way, we position Black Brazilian female politicians as being 
part of a local and global digitally connected Black experi-
ence. As in many parts of the world, when Black women in 
Brazil do become visible in mainstream media and public 
arenas, they become prime targets for hate attacks. A study 
suggests that Black women are 84 percent more likely than 
white women to be mentioned in abusive comments on 
Twitter (Amnesty International 2018). Consequently, Black 
women gather in online networks of link visibility, creating 
coping mechanisms, digitally reembodied and resistant 
practices (Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2020, 422). 
A caveat is that we are writing about Black women in the 
plural even though we are referring mostly to the political 
career and social media use of one woman, Souza. We are 
inspired by the Brazilian writer Conceição Evaristo. Writing 
essays, poems, short stories, and novels, Evaristo refers to 
her writing as “escrevivência,” mixing the Portuguese verb 
escrever (“to write”) with the noun vivência (“lived experi-
ence”). For Black women, personal narratives are central 
to a collective cultural memory that draws from ancestral 
struggles and legacies. In this way, it is essential to shift 
the role of Brazilian Black women in literature from “repre-
sentation to self-presentation” (Evaristo 2005), reaffirming 
Black women’s central role in shaping culture and society. 
Here, we establish parallels between Evaristo’s “escrevivên-
cia” and autoethnographic approaches to writing and re-
searching. Both are predicated on the ability to invite read-
ers into the lived experience of the protagonist(s) and to 
experience it viscerally (Boylorn and Orbe 2014, 15). 
Moreover, we stress the linkages between intersectional 
and autoethnographic perspectives. By embracing position-
ality, we acknowledge the privileges that we experience 
“alongside marginalisation and take responsibility for our 
subjective lenses through reflexivity” (Boylorn and Orbe 
2014, 15). To achieve this, we engage “the complex ways in 
which our own identities are best understood through ex-
plorations of intersectionality—the cultural synergy that is 
created through interactions of race/ethnicity, gender/sex, 
socioeconomic status, sexuality, nationality, age, spiritual-
ity, and/or abilities” (Boylorn and Orbe 2014, 6). In other 
words, as autoethnographers, we identify and use multi-
ple standpoints to situate stories and lives, calling out po-
sitions of privilege and exposing moments of vulnerability 
(Boylorn and Orbe 2014, 18). 
INTERSECTIONAL FEMINISM: BINDING 
OPPRESSED REALITIES 
Intersectionality is related but not restricted to third-wave 
feminism, when women of color, LGBTQ+, disabled, and 
working-class pointed out the urgent need for a more inclu-
sive feminism. bell hooks (2000, 5), for instance, suggested 
that the feminist movement needed to engage in self-criti-
cism to ensure that its discourses did not remain restricted 
to highly literate, well-educated, and materially privileged 
circles of white women. Because of this, feminist activists 
recognized that the movement should urgently address the 
multiple layers of intra-group oppression that women face. 
This should include class and race, among many other as-
pects. Although these discussions had been taking place 
among Black feminists for many years and in many different 
contexts (see Gonzalez and Hasenbalg 1982 in Brazil, for 
example), the law professor Kimberlé Crenshaw is credited 
with coining the term: 
By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope 
to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt 
the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or 
separable. While the primary intersections that I ex-
plore here are between race and gender, the concept 
can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such 
as class, sexual orientation, age, and color. (Crenshaw 
1991, 1244-1245) 
Adopted earlier by scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins 
(1986), perspectives on standpoint feminism focused on the 
unique position occupied by Black women to understand 
social oppression. Black feminist thought emphasizes three 
elements: self-definition and self-valuation; the interlock-
ing nature of oppression; and the importance of African 
American women’s culture (Collins 1986, 514). Thus, as 
agents of knowledge, Black women generate a distinctive 
standpoint on existing sociological paradigms. Echoing 
these ideas in Brazil, Djamila Ribeiro (2017) argues that 
Black women need to be attentive to their unique perspec-
tives on what marginality means. She demonstrates the 
ways in which these perspectives can be used in the fight 
against racist, classist, and sexist domination (Ribeiro 
2017). Ribeiro (2017) has proposed the expression “lugar de 
fala,” which has reached beyond academic circles, having 
been adopted by groups of people interested in the power 
relations involved in discourse. “Lugar de fala” can be lit-
erally translated as “place of speech” because it has been 
used to acknowledge the origin/locus of the enunciator. The 
expression refers to the enunciator’s identity in terms of 
race, gender, sexual orientation, and class—among other el-
ements—and how such identity elements inform and shape 
that person’s experiences and worldviews. In this way, one 
can understand the subtleties and complexities entailed in 
experiencing racism and sexism, for instance, and how 
these experiences might vary from the perspective of a 
white male, a white female, or a man or a woman of color. 
One classic example refers to the issue of women in the 
job market. While white women were concerned about their 
struggles to “enter the job market,” Black women have al-
ways been dehumanized in the workplace. Unlike white 
women, Black women were never perceived as delicate or 
lacking physical strength. Therefore, while white women 
were competing with white men for white-collar positions, 
Black women were working exhausting hours in fields and 
factories (Souza, autoethnographic audio diary, May 21, 
2020). 
In addition to drawing inspiration from standpoint fem-
inism, Ribeiro’s notions of “lugar de fala” share common 
traits with Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of “situated 
knowledges” (1988). Both notions, “situated knowledges” 
and “lugares de fala,” acknowledge that bodies are located 
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within and voices emerge from specific places and sociohis-
toric times. What Ribeiro’s (2017) perspectives on “lugar de 
fala” add is a call for socially privileged groups to play an 
active role in providing spaces for marginalized groups. This 
can help ensure that marginalized peoples can occupy their 
places when speaking out about their own experiences of 
marginalization and with their own voices. 
However, the concept of “lugar de fala” has been inter-
preted in an overly literal manner, which limits its socially 
transformative potential. According to this interpretation, 
people would not be allowed to speak about an issue un-
less they belonged to that specific identity group. For ex-
ample, a man should not speak about sexism, and a white 
person should not discuss racism. Following this logic, peo-
ple would become isolated in identity bubbles because the 
expressions that stem from outside the authorized “loci of 
enunciations” must be silenced. This interpretation con-
nects to international debates on identity politics. In the 
United States, for example, and elsewhere, the idea of 
“identity politics” has been associated with deepening po-
litical divisions. Hilary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in 
2016, for instance, has been blamed on her discussion of 
identity and inequality during the campaign. Some authors 
worry that people might be reinforcing a social construction 
by organizing around specific identity issues, such as being 
Black or female, eroding collective organization and strug-
gle (Haider 2018). However, to acknowledge that race and 
gender are socially constructed is not a reason to imply 
that they do not matter. The contrasting of gender and race 
to class contributes to a false dichotomy. The struggles of 
raced, gendered, and sexual marginalities are not situated 
in opposition to economic dispossession. In fact, they in-
tersect, and this is precisely what intersectional theories 
propose. In other words, there are no inherent struggles 
between anticapitalism, antiracism, and feminist struggles. 
Therefore, the link visibility strategies used by Black female 
politicians like Renata Souza are connected to the creation 
of anticapitalism, antiracism, and feminist solidarities. 
Drawing from the work of Djamila Ribeiro (2017) on “lu-
gar de fala,” we argue that intersectionality represents a call 
for a sweeping solidarity. Feelings of solidarity, and the re-
sulting mobilization power that emerges from it, can occur 
only if people acquire a deeper understanding of the dif-
ferent layers of oppression that various identity groups are 
subjected to. The first step needed to gain this understand-
ing is listening and recognizing their own different “loci 
of enunciations” (“lugares de fala”). Based on these reflec-
tions, we suggest that intersectional feminism is not divi-
sive. As Ribeiro puts it, its aims are not to create hierarchies 
between worse or better forms of oppression; rather, inter-
sectional feminism is about breaking away from an unequal 
society by developing new social projects and models (2017, 
9). Additionally, intersectionality manifests itself as some-
thing that goes beyond an academic concept, representing 
a methodological approach and a political stance. This in-
volves amplifying the intellectual production of women of 
color, considering their active and pivotal role in resisting 
and marginalization. 
We want to stress an understanding of intersectionality 
as a call for recognizing privileges, which can be uncom-
fortable and painful. Just like autoethnography, recognizing 
Figure 1. Instagram post by Renata Souza (public 
profile) on December 10, 2019, which shows her 
standing in front of ALERJ’s painting. 
privileges exposes vulnerabilities. This process requires 
asking: from our lived experiences, are we in a position to 
tell this story? Ribeiro (2017) asks that people who expe-
rience raced and gendered privileges to open up and in-
deed create opportunities for the marginalized to speak for 
themselves. This, in turn, can help pave the way for col-
lective places of speech (Ribeiro 2017). In what follows, we 
apply these ideas, which relate to giving “voice” to notions 
of visibility. As voices become louder, marginalized per-
spectives also become more visibly linked and, as we will 
demonstrate, link visibility reduces the chances of visibility 
turning into vulnerability. 
THE MULTIPLE FACETS OF VISIBILITY 
When I took office, it was very symbolic to enter the 
plenary and to look at a huge painting with the faces 
of men, many men. There are no women, no Black per-
sons, only white men. This painting is going to com-
plete one hundred years and, unfortunately, little has 
changed. But it’s powerful and symbolic to be there in 
that space and to be able to fight to change the faces 
of this painting. (Souza, autoethnographic audio diary, 
May 21, 2020) 
The concept of “visibility,” which was adapted from gen-
der and minority studies for the social sciences, has been 
associated with people who have been neglected, ignored, 
or rendered invisible in society (Brighenti 2010). Here, visi-
bility features as an essential tool for empowerment, recog-
nition, and acknowledgment in society. Issues such as iden-
tity politics, class, and poverty rely on visibility to be 
addressed, while social movements rely on having injustices 
made visible in their struggles. Invisibility, on the other 
hand, creates exclusion and marginalization (Uldam 2017, 
44). In this context, new technologies, and particularly so-
cial media, can allegedly provide more diverse representa-
tion and voice a greater plurality of perspectives. Some of 
their advantages include helping marginalized groups (such 
as women of color) manage their own social image, tell their 
own stories in their own terms, and create linkages between 
their thoughts and their lived experiences (Sobande, Fear-
full, and Brownlie 2020, 422). 
However, visibility is a double-edged sword. The visibil-
ity that the internet technologies confer on marginalized 
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groups can easily result in surveillance. For instance, the ef-
ficiency of the panopticon prison model, a metaphor used 
by Foucault (1977), depends upon the invisibility of the 
watcher. At the same time, the role of invisibility is not 
simply to highlight the power of the authorities who watch 
but also to render the panopticon efficient via uncertainty. 
Relying upon a technology of invisibility with the panop-
ticon, a spectacle of surveillance (the tower) can be ac-
complished. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in itself, sur-
veillance does not instill discipline as there also has to be 
the threat (and presumably, at some point, the actuality) of 
punishment. This means that surveillance must be backed 
up by power. It can amplify power but cannot serve as the 
basis of power itself. According to Andrea Brighenti, we are 
faced with “regimes of visibility,” which are highly depen-
dent upon contexts and complex social, technical, and po-
litical arrangements, making visibility an ambiguous phe-
nomenon (2010, 3). 
Having addressed the sociological perspectives on vis-
ibility, we move to specific elements of visibility on-
line—namely, visibility on social media in a context of ac-
tivism. According to Julie Uldam, on the one hand, social 
media enables activists to gain visibility for their cam-
paigns; on the other hand, social media also make activists 
more vulnerable by enabling companies that wish to con-
tain the visibility of their critics to do so (2017, 55). Dis-
cussing the Russian context, Tatiana Lokot examines how 
activists adopt strategies for being seen without being in 
danger, such as engaging in reverse surveillance of law en-
forcement and providing photographic and video evidence 
of police surveillance (2018, 142). Although these two per-
spectives are certainly useful, they do not incorporate issues 
of gender and race in their analyses. Based on our own 
experiences as politically active women, we suggest that 
achieving visibility might have a unique set of implications 
for women of color. 
Here, we turn to the intersectional work of women of 
color on visibility, surveillance, and digital technologies. 
Safiya Noble’s (2013, 2018) research on racist and sexist 
Google search results unveils important insights. She 
demonstrates how “the commodification of women as 
pornographic objects taken together articulate the disturb-
ing commercial viability of Black women as web commodi-
ties” (Noble 2013, 14). Therefore, by providing little reliable 
and historically contextualized information about women 
and people of color, particularly Black women and girls, 
commercial internet searches serve “as a means for silenc-
ing black women and girls as social and political agents” 
(Noble 2013, 17). Additionally, one must question the idea 
of technology as being value free or neutral. To cite Noble: 
the dominant notion of search results as being objec-
tive and popular makes it seem as if misogynist or racist 
search results are a simple mirror of the collective. Not 
only do problematic search results seem normal, but 
they seem completely unavoidable as well, even though 
these ideas have been thoroughly debunked by schol-
ars. (2018, 36) 
In Dark Matters, Simone Browne criticizes the ways in 
which the surveillance of blackness is often unperceivable 
within the study of surveillance. She identifies blackness as 
“the non-nameable matter that matters the racialized disci-
plinary society” (2015, 9). Therefore, it is essential to locate 
blackness as a “key site through which surveillance is prac-
ticed, narrated and enacted” (Browne 2015, 9). Also refer-
ring to the surveillance of blackness, Ruha Benjamin (2019) 
uses the expression “the new Jim Code”—in a reference to 
the Jim Crow laws that enforced racial discrimination in the 
southern United States. She shares memories of growing up 
with a sense of being constantly watched in a “carceral web 
in which other people’s safety and freedom are predicated 
on our [Black people’s] containment” (2019, vii). She then 
defines the new Jim Code as a hostile form of systemic bias 
against Black women and men as “we continue to be moni-
tored and measured,” but without the audible rumble of he-
licopters to which we can point" (Benjamin 2019, vii). 
Thus, in the age of big data, Black men and women re-
main trapped in media invisibility or hyper (sexualized, 
criminalized) media visibility. The former leads to exclusion 
and marginalization. The latter leads to surveillance and 
vulnerability. In the Brazilian context, as one would expect, 
reaching media visibility in more nuanced ways remains 
challenging. Renata Souza’s work as a state deputy illus-
trates this. As women and politically active researchers, 
we are disheartened by the level of misogynist and racist 
abuse targeted at women of color in politics on social me-
dia. Medrado and Paulla have both felt uncomfortable read-
ing some of the comments that Souza receives on her posts 
on Twitter and Instagram. Such hatred manifests in ref-
erences to the politician’s gender, race, and physical ap-
pearance but also in serious incidents that involve rape and 
death threats (interview with Evelyn Melo, May 22, 2020). 
Unfortunately, Marielle Franco’s murder demonstrates how 
being in the spotlight brings dangers that go beyond online 
attacks to concrete real-life violence. Indeed, the trajecto-
ries of Black women in Brazilian politics have been marked 
by significant hardships, as we demonstrate in the next sec-
tion. 
BLACK WOMEN IN BRAZILIAN POLITICS 
Brazil was the last American nation to abolish slavery; it did 
so on May 13, 1888. Although the country has projected an 
image of cordial relations, practices of racial discrimination 
have helped perpetuate the social and political invisibility 
of Black women, rendering many of them de facto nonciti-
zens. Since the country’s redemocratization, with the 1989 
direct presidential elections, the myth of racial democracy6 
This myth originated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from a comparison with the racial situation in the United States 
at the time. It was advocated by Freyre (1936), whose defense was that Brazil’s inequality was created by economic differences rather than 
by race. Since then, these ideas have always been very strong in the Brazilian collective imagination. 
6 
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has started to be challenged and rejected (Caldeira 2000). 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, programs 
of affirmative action in universities and public service jobs 
started to gain momentum. As public debates about racial 
identity and racism took place through the mass media, 
geographers noted a gradual “browning” and “blackening” 
of the population. By comparing the 2000 and the 2010 
censuses, we can see that there was an increase in people 
who declared themselves Black (from 6.2 percent in 2000 
to 7.6 percent in 2010) and brown (from 38.5 percent in 
2000 to 43.1 percent in 2010). This means that by 2010 
Black and brown people represented a statistical majority in 
Brazil with 50.7 percent of the population. As for Black and 
brown women, they represented 25.3 percent of the Brazil-
ian population (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatís-
tica 2010).7 
Yet systemic oppression is a common occurrence for 
Black Brazilian women in multiple ways. Black women are 
still overrepresented in poverty, unemployment, homeless-
ness, and incarceration, and underrepresented in academia 
and politics (Mowatt, French, and Malebranche 2013, 648). 
The scarcity of Black female voices also applies to the lack 
of studies that focus on Black women in politics in Brazil. 
However, there are exceptions. Sueli Carneiro, a philoso-
pher and writer, has highlighted the need to “blacken” fem-
inism in the country. The expression “blackening feminism” 
was devised as an attempt to challenge a universalist con-
ception of a woman that is based on Western white women’s 
paradigms. The idea of blackening feminism led to the ur-
gency for Black women to strengthen their roles as political 
subjects, pushing a political agenda organized around the 
notion of “nós,” which in Portuguese means both “us” and 
“ties” (2003, 6-7). 
Even in the present day, stories of Black women who be-
came successful politicians represent the exception. One of 
them was Benedita da Silva, born in 1942 in the favela of 
Chapéu Mangueira in Rio de Janeiro. The highlight of her 
political career included becoming the first female sena-
tor in Brazil. In 2002 Da Silva became the first woman and 
the first Black person to assume a state governorship in the 
country (Da Silva, Mendonça, and Benjamin 1997). Four-
teen years later, in 2016, Marielle Franco was elected with 
46,505 votes for Rio’s city council. As was the case with 
Da Silva, this was a remarkable achievement for a working-
class, Black, and lesbian woman like Franco. Sadly, her first 
political term was cut short by her assassination. 
Franco’s skin color, social class, gender, and sexual orien-
tation illustrate what it means to be marginalized in Brazil-
ian society on many intersectional levels. In what follows, 
we provide a table that summarizes how this marginaliza-
tion of women and particularly Black women translates into 
Figure 2. Representation of women of color as state 
legislators in Rio in the 2018 elections. 
Source: the authors (based on information from the ALERJ website; see 
http://www.alerj.rj.gov.br/Deputados/QuemSao?AspxAutoDetectCookieSup-
port=1). 
* Although twelve women were elected, eleven women currently work as state 
legislators in Rio de Janeiro. One of the twelve resigned to work at a social assis-
tance and human rights city secretariat. A man replaced her. 
low numbers of female candidates elected for office in 2018. 
The elections that year comprised voting for state and fed-
eral legislator, senator, state governor, and president. It is 
worth noting that we include self-declared trans women un-
der the category of women.8 The table below, however, does 
not include trans women as there were no trans women 
elected for the state legislature of Rio de Janeiro (the focus 
or our research). Black and brown women were placed under 
the same category because this was the way the federal and 
state legislative chambers identified elected politicians. We 
also follow a logic of self-declaration for the racial cate-
gories of elected politicians. 
If we draw a comparison to 2014, when Brazil held the 
previous election for the same political posts, we can find 
a few achievements for female politicians and for Black and 
brown women. The number of women who were elected for 
the Federal Chamber of Deputies increased from fifty-one 
in 2014 to seventy-seven in 2018 (from 10 percent to 15 per-
cent). In Rio de Janeiro, Renata Souza and three other Black 
women were elected for the State Chamber of Deputies 
(ALERJ) in 2018, which corresponds to over 36 percent of 
the women elected. This represents an increase compared 
to 2014, when only eight women were elected for ALERJ. 
However, the female Black and brown representation in 
higher-ranking political posts is still extremely low: 1.8 per-
cent in the Senate and 3.7 percent in state government. This 
is problematic if we consider that Black and brown women 
comprise over 25 percent of the population. 
The national census in Brazil is carried out every ten years, but the 2020 census has been postponed until 2021 due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic. 
As of the time of writing, two state legislators—Robeyoncé de Lima (PSOL, Pernambuco) and Erica Malunguinho (PSOL, São Paulo)—were 
elected, and they identify as women. Erika Hilton, also elected as a state legislator for São Paulo, identifies as “transvestigender,” reject-
ing binary gender definitions. In 2018 Brazil’s Election Supreme Court ruled that trans people could register their candidacies according 
to their gender identifications. 
7 
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RENATA SOUZA’S VISIBILITY IN DEFENSE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
As soon as he took office, in February 2019, Wilson Witzel, 
Rio’s elected governor, led violent police operations in the 
Fallet Fogueteiro favela, which resulted in thirteen deaths. 
A few months later, on May 5, 2019, he posted a video on 
his Twitter account. The scene was shocking: Witzel ap-
peared in a helicopter, flying over impoverished communi-
ties in the city of Angra dos Reis, accompanied by the city’s 
mayor and by police officers. Rifles were sticking out from 
the helicopter as the police shot down at tents on a hill. Act-
ing as the leader of the Human Rights Commission, Renata 
Souza denounced the governor’s actions to the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) and to the United Nations on 
May 7, 2019. In a formal document, Souza requested that in-
ternational entities made a recommendation to reduce po-
lice lethality in Rio. She informed her constituents of her 
request by posting a tweet that said, “we denounced the 
Brazilian government to the OAS. We won’t tolerate that se-
rious violations to life become naturalized. Declarations by 
the president and the governor stimulate violence. These 
policies are based on crimes against humanity, on torture, 
and they go against our constitution.” 
Interviews with Souza’s staff revealed that a common 
strategy was to communicate new political facts via Twitter. 
Following her tweet, Souza’s social media team posted a 
screen capture of the same tweet on Instagram, which gath-
ered 1,153 likes and 50 comments (as of the time of writing). 
Souza’s social media manager Marina Iris noted that the 
team uses Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
WhatsApp, considering that all platforms integrate as one 
“unified social network.” However, she believed (and our 
digital ethnographic observations confirmed) that Insta-
gram provided them with a “friendlier environment” than 
Twitter and Facebook. “Because it’s image-driven and more 
personal, we can use personalized images without the need 
to depoliticize them. In fact, it’s easy to turn personal pho-
tos into political messages” (personal communication/in-
terview, June 5, 2020). Here, the right to be seen on her own 
terms for her own audiences and using her own aesthet-
ics emerged as a key aspect of Renata Souza’s link visibility 
strategies (Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2020), particu-
Figure 3. Representation of women of color as 
federal legislators in Brazil in the 2018 elections. 
Source: the authors. See http://www.generonumero.media/camara-dos-deputa-
dos-tera-mais-mulheres-brancas-negras-e-indigena-e-menos-homens-brancos-
em-2019/. 
* The category “yellow” in Brazil refers to people of Asian descent, particularly 
Japanese Brazilians. 
larly on her Instagram profile. 
In what follows, we provide examples of how Souza’s for-
mal complaint against the governor to the OAS and the 
United Nations generated visibility in traditional and social 
media. 
LOCAL TV NEWS 
NATIONAL TV NEWS 
• The program RJ 2 ran a five-minute story about the 
incident on May 7, 2019.9 The program is broadcast 
by the local branch of the Globo Network every day at 
7:10 p.m. in Rio de Janeiro and the greater Rio region. 
• The program SBT Rio, broadcast by the local broad-
caster SBT (Sistema Brasileiro de Telecomunicações), 
ran a four-minute story on May 7, 2019, in the noon 
edition.10 
• A two-minute story ran on the national morning pro-
gram Bom Dia Brasil (Good Morning Brazil), broadcast 
daily at 8 a.m. by TV Globo, on May 8, 2019.11 
Available at https://globoplay.globo.com/v/7597924/. 
Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6KVxJDsGBc. 
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NATIONAL NEWS 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS OUTLETS 
Drawing from our empirical research on Souza’s media 
visibility strategies, we briefly compare the affordances of 
traditional and social media in the context of visibility and 
vulnerability. We ask: does visibility in traditional media 
come with the same vulnerability as in social media? The 
first important point is that women politicians tend to be 
less visible in traditional media coverage than male politi-
cians (Van der Pas and Aaldering 2020, 124). In this context, 
it is suggested that gaining more visibility in traditional 
media can aid female politicians. Kruikemeier, Gattermann, 
and Vliegenthart, for instance, acknowledge that visibility 
can help political actors achieve electoral success during 
campaign periods, convey their political viewpoints, and 
acquire recognition and credibility (2018, 215). Tradi-
tional—and particularly mainstream—media are perceived 
as being professional among the public. Therefore, it is ex-
pected that “traditional news coverage of politicians would 
have a positive effect on the social media agenda in terms of 
attentiveness” (Kruikemeier, Gattermann, and Vliegenthart 
2018, 216). These observations were confirmed in our re-
search. In Souza’s case, it is remarkable that a newly elected 
state legislator appeared on national television news. Her 
appeal to the United Nations and the OAS created a “po-
litical fact,” which she identified as an effective “link vis-
ibility strategy” (Souza, interview, May 21, 2020). In our 
interviews, Marina Iris (Souza’s communication manager) 
confirmed that they were pleased to see that the main-
stream media, such as TV news and newspapers, had picked 
up Souza’s complaints about human rights abuses because 
“this conferred credibility and legitimacy to her claims and 
led to a formal investigation by international organizations, 
such as the OAS and the UN” (Iris, personal communica-
tion/interview, August 3, 2020). 
At the same time, traditional media visibility often 
comes at the cost of problematic media representations. 
Figure 4. Representation of women of color as 
senators in Brazil in the 2018 elections. 
Source: the authors (based on information from the Senate website; see 
https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/senadores/em-exercicio). 
* Each state elects two senators. The two senators elected for Rio de Janeiro were 
white men. 
Figure 5. Representation of women of color as state 
governors in Brazil in the 2018 elections. 
Source: the authors. See https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/eleicao-
em-numeros/noticia/2018/10/28/apenas-um-estado-do-pais-sera-comandado-
por-uma-mulher.ghtml. 
Daphne Van der Pas and Loes Aaldering suggest that gender 
stereotypes can lead to differences in types of traditional 
media coverage of male and female politicians; women are 
typically associated with private life and men with public 
life, and political leadership is associated with masculinity 
(2020, 117). This has implications for women in politics: 
by not adhering to the stereotypes, they are more likely 
to receive negative reporting and evaluations (Van der Pas 
• A story ran on the national morning news program by 
the Broadcaster Band News on May 8, 2019.12 
• Stories appeared on G1 (online news portal) on May 
7, 2019,13 and UOL (online news portal) on May 11, 
2019.14 
• Fox News published a story on the Americas section 
of their website on May 8, 2019.15 
• Souza gave an interview for Deutsche Welle Brasil on 
May 22, 2019 (in Portuguese).16 
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and Aaldering 2020, 117). Referring to the Brazilian context, 
Luís Miguel and Flávia Biroli add a layer of complexity to 
the issues of visibility for female politicians in traditional 
media. In addition to being less visible in quantitative 
terms, women’s political agendas are associated with less 
prestigious issues, such as family and childhood. This re-
sults in a lower symbolic capital compared to men (2009, 
67-69). 
With social media, on the surface, the greater one’s vis-
ibility, the better. For female politicians whose careers de-
mand a high degree of social media publicness, the logics of 
attention and reputation matter. In this way, female politi-
cians are prompted to pursue markets of visibility in the 
form of likes, comments, and retweets, which can advance 
their careers, forge new social connections, and offer oppor-
tunities for status (Duffy and Hund 2019, 4983). At the same 
time, “the act of communicating in public is fraught with 
risk and includes the potential for criticism, hate, and ha-
rassment. Unsurprisingly, experiences of online harassment 
often map onto axes of social identity, including gender, 
sexuality, race, age, and class” (Duffy and Hund 2019, 4984). 
A report published by Amnesty International in 2018 looked 
at 778 women journalists and politicians in the United 
States and the United Kingdom and found that women of 
color were 34 percent more likely to be the targets of ha-
rassment than white women. Black women were targeted 
most of all: one in every ten tweets sent to them was abu-
sive or problematic (Dreyfuss 2018, 2). In this context, so-
cial media could potentially offer alternative possibilities 
for connection and professional success (Sobande, Fearfull, 
and Brownlie 2020). At the same time, social media repre-
sent toxic environments for women (Duffy and Hund 2019; 
Dreyfuss 2018). As a response to this challenging scenario, 
Souza’s team decided to develop online communication 
strategies based on social media “echo chambers and reflec-
tion schemes.” To cite Souza: 
We notice that our pages boost and confer visibility 
on other pages that address themes of global oppres-
sion and discuss issues of gender, race, class, disability. 
Then, these other pages also boost our content and give 
visibility to our actions. I was one of the first politicians 
to give an interview to a digital platform called Notí-
cia Preta (Black News). We got good visibility, they got 
good visibility, so this is like a two-way street. We do 
this to become less exposed to political and digital vi-
olence. We create a network of mutual protection. The 
more I achieve visibility, the more I am attacked and 
the more my network of solidarity grows. This repre-
sents a kind of link visibility. (Souza, autoethnographic 
audio diary, May 21, 2020) 
In our interview with Marina Iris, she elaborated on what 
Souza’s team meant by link visibility as a tool for intersec-
tional resistance, existence, and reexistence/reembodiment 
online (Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2020). She empha-
sized that Souza’s social media pages often post content 
that mirrors or is connected to content posted by alterna-
tive media outlets such as Mídia Ninja (@midianija, which 
has 2.4 million followers on Instagram and 672,300 follow-
ers on Twitter) and Notícia Preta (@noticiapretabr, which 
has 210,000 followers on Instagram, and @NoticiaPreta, 
which has 9,116 followers on Twitter) (Iris, personal com-
Figure 6. Renata Souza’s (public profile) tweet on 
May 7, 2019. 
Figure 7. Renata Souza’s Instagram post (with a 
screenshot of her original tweet of May 7, 2019). 
munication/interview, August 3, 2020). Such outlets em-
brace intersectional agendas, such as the antiracist, anti-
sexist, pro-LGBTQIA+, and pro-working-class struggles. 
Our digital ethnographic observations confirmed the ways 
in which notions of intersectionality fed into Souza’s link 
visibility strategies and vice versa. Additionally, link visibil-
ity provided Souza with the tools not only to get attention 
for her political agenda but also to obtain self- and collec-
tive protection. 
Furthermore, we observed how such strategies worked in 
terms of social media metrics. We compared Souza’s num-
ber of followers on Instagram with that of other state leg-
islators (affiliated with different political parties) in Rio de 
Janeiro. Her number of followers (88,200 on Instagram and 
57,000 on Twitter) is much smaller than that of state deputy 
Bebeto (@bebeto7/PODE Party, who has 483,000 followers 
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on Instagram and 566,700 followers on Twitter). However, 
this is explained by the fact that Bebeto was a celebrity soc-
cer player before he got into politics. If compared to other 
noncelebrity state deputies, such as Alana Passos (PSL, Bol-
sonaro’s former party), who has a slightly higher number of 
followers on Instagram and Twitter (58,100 and 32,900, re-
spectively), and Rio’s most voted-for state deputy Rodrigo 
Amorim (PSL), who has 34,100 Instagram and 2,659 Twitter 
followers, Souza fares well on social media. 
At the same time, as researchers and politically active 
women, but also as Souza’s personal friends, we were wor-
ried to observe how her stark opposition to Rio’s governor 
placed her simultaneously in a position of visibility and vul-
nerability. A former judge, Witzel (Social Christian Party, or 
PSC) was elected after presenting himself as an ally of Bol-
sonaro. He has made public statements that legitimize po-
lice killings in the favelas. According to this perspective, not 
uncommon among conservative politicians, police are told 
to do whatever it takes to fight crime, such as “aiming and 
shooting in the little head” (an expression that became as-
sociated with Witzel’s rhetoric). Security protocols, which 
included using helicopters as platforms for sharpshooters, 
have also been criticized by opposition politicians, favela 
collectives, and civil society organizations (see below). 
Therefore, in a context of violent and racist political 
rhetoric, it was not surprising that the governor and his al-
lies tried to silence Souza. As close observers (Medrado and 
Paulla) and protagonists (Souza herself) of the incident, 
we were shocked by the virulence of the attacks. After de-
nouncing the governor, Souza’s visibility generated what we 
have referred to elsewhere as a “visibility crisis” (Medrado 
and Rega, forthcoming). Legislators from Witzel’s party, 
PSC, made a formal request to the presidency of the State 
Legislative Chamber (ALERJ) to remove her from office. 
Souza’s adversaries claimed that she made the complaint on 
behalf of the entire Human Rights Commission, which has 
members who are government allies (and thus would not 
endorse the complaint), rather than under her individual 
name. This could technically make her complaint invalid. 
We found it disconcerting that white male colleagues from a 
right-wing party attempted to simply remove a Black female 
representative from office only three months after starting 
her mandate. Fortunately, the attempt was unsuccessful: 
ALERJ’s president, André Ceciliano (Workers’ Party), closed 
the case against Souza. He emphasized that she made the 
complaint under her own name and that she was simply do-
ing her job as a legislator, which entailed acting as a watch-
dog of the executive power. 
Once again, the incident reminded us of the dangers en-
tailed in women of color’s finding of and use of their voice. 
To cite bell hooks, “for us, speaking is not solely an ex-
pression of creative power, it is an act of resistance, a po-
litical gesture that challenges the politics of domination 
that would render us nameless and voiceless. As such it 
is a courageous act; as such it represents a threat” (2019, 
37). During our digital ethnographic observations, we found 
several offensive comments in Souza’s profile, such as the 
ones posted in response to her tweet on May 7, 2019. Here, 
we provide a translation of some of them: “you defend crim-
inals, this party is trash”; “you need a detox treatment. You 
must be on drugs”; “what’s up criminal defenders @psol50, 
Figure 8. School, don’t shoot. Souza’s Instagram 
post on May 9, 2019. 
it’s over for you! Now it’s all about ‘head shot’!” [a reference 
to the governor’s comment about shooting people in the 
head]; “did you denounce Maduro? You are trash!” 
Although some of the comments were not race or gender 
specific, targeting all politicians aligned with left-wing par-
ties, some contained racist messages, such as implying that 
Souza was a drug addict or telling her to “get busy with 
work” (as a response to a tweet in which she is communi-
cating her work). A few comments contained death threats, 
such as the one that implied that the fate of PSOL politi-
cians was to be “shot in the head.” This caused us repulsion: 
Marielle Franco was killed by four shots to the head. Addi-
tionally, working as a female politician brought additional 
layers of abuse, as Evelyn Mello exemplified when compar-
ing the online offenses targeted at the PSOL female politi-
cians in comparison to male politicians: 
The women, they are attacked with sexist, misogynous 
comments. We need to remember than when Dilma was 
impeached, they made a sticker to be attached to cars’ 
fuel fillers. The sticker was a photomontage, and Dilma 
had her legs spread open so that one would insert the 
fuel hose into the private parts of an elected president. 
And all the adjectives used against her referred to her 
“unsatisfactory love life.” (Mello, personal communica-
tion/interview, May 22, 2020) 
As one would expect, during the period when opponents 
attacked her, Souza achieved an even higher degree of on-
line and traditional media visibility. This manifested in sev-
eral expressions of support, such as a story in the newspa-
per O Globo17; a story in the broadsheet newspaper Folha 
de São Paulo18; and Twitter and Instagram posts by media 
platforms and influencers with a large follower base, such 
as Notícia Preta, Mídia Ninja, the singer Caetano Veloso, 





 http://online.ucpress.edu/gp/article-pdf/2/1/24503/465807/globalperspectives_2021_2_1_24503.pdf by Liba H
ladik on 08 June 2021
Figure 9a, figure 9b, and figure 9c. Screen captures with a compilation of offensive comments to Souza’s tweet 
on May 7, 2019. 
the comedian Gregório Duvivier, and the journalist Flávia 
Oliveira. Additionally, Souza’s team started an online peti-
tion in support of democracy and her mandate, which gath-
ered more than eleven thousand signatures.19 
Drawing from these observations, Souza’s case revealed 
the multiple facets of visibility that emerged during her 
visibility journey. This journey moved from (a) a position 
of invisibility, as we can infer from her earlier quote on 
the absolute lack of Black female faces among the faces of 
politicians; to (b) a position of hypervisibility, with her com-
plaints against the governor’s “shooting in the head” poli-
cies in the spotlight, leading her to a visibility crisis; to (c) 
her link visibility strategies as ways to protect herself and 
her allies. 
In this article, we have explored Renata Souza’s multiple 
facets of visibility, which entailed dealing with the com-
plexities of being trapped between invisibility, hypervisibil-
ity, and surveillance (Noble 2013; Browne 2015; Benjamin 
2019). In the early stages of her mandate, when she ob-
tained visibility for her stance against the governor’s hu-
man rights abuses, Souza faced a critical visibility moment. 
To protect herself, she had to resort to more intense dy-
namics of establishing networks of solidarity. We have re-
ferred to this as link visibility, defining the term as a tool to 
strengthen Black women’s existence, resistance, and reexis-
tence and reembodiment online, which can be used in the 
fight for a more just world. We have also identified the ways 
in which link visibility is connected to intersectional con-
ceptual and methodological approaches. By drawing from 
our own reflections and focusing on the lived experiences of 
a Black female politician (who is also an author of this arti-
cle), we hope to have demonstrated that intersectional fem-
inism can provide a useful contextual framework for stud-
ies of visibility. If Black female politicians, such as Souza, 
rely on connection for protection, speaking out against op-
pression represents the binding force that enables this con-
nection. To cite bell hooks: “when we end our silence, we 
speak in a liberating voice, our words connect us with any-
one, anywhere who lives in silence” (2019, 55). 
HOW CAN WE PROTECT WOMEN OF COLOR 
ONLINE? 
As a collective reflection from us, this question raises con-
cerns. These start with the loose definitions of different 
forms of online aggression, which include internet defama-
tion, fake news, and hate speech. Evelyn Mello highlights 
this problem: “people always talk about fake news, but the 
term does not encompass all the issues. Yes, people send 
false information, but they also spread messages that are 
out of context, and even true information, like publicizing 
someone’s home address for intimidation, or simply hate 
speech” (personal communication/interview, May 22, 
2020). The task of defining hate speech is beyond the scope 
of this article. Here, we will just briefly mention that hate 
speech refers to expressing opinions and ideas in any form 
(such as written, visual, or artistic) and disseminating them 
through any media. Such expressions carry “intense and ir-
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Figure 10a, figure 10b, figure 10c and figure 10d. Twitter and Instagram posts in support of Souza. 
Clockwise from top left: Gregorio Duvivier, Flávia Oliveira, Mídia Ninja, and Caetano Veloso. All are public profiles. 
wards an individual or group, targeted because of their hav-
ing certain—actual or perceived—protected characteristics” 
(ARTICLE 19 2015, 10). ARTICLE 19 has published reports 
with recommendations for state governments to tackle the 
issue, to invest in digital literacy skills, and to promote me-
dia pluralism. The organization also recognizes that “dom-
inant social media companies hold considerable power over 
the flow of information” and that the way these companies 
have dealt with hate speech “has been of particular concern 
to stakeholders.” At the same time, deciding whether a spe-
cific message can be identified as unlawful hate speech rep-
resents a complex task, and “any restriction on freedom of 
expression, whatever the objective it seeks to achieve, nec-
essarily raises a series of legal questions.” Taking into con-
sideration discussions about combating free speech versus 
protecting freedom of expression, ARTICLE 19 recommends 
a new model of "effective self-regulation for social media, 
which we will cite in full: 
This model could take the form of a dedicated “social 
media council”—inspired by the self-regulation created 
to support and promote journalistic ethics and high 
standards in print media. We believe that effective self-
regulation could offer an appropriate framework 
through which to address the current problems with 
content moderation by social media companies, includ-
ing “hate speech” on their platforms. (2018, 4-5) 
In this article, we focused on our perspectives as women, 
women of color, citizens, voters, researchers, and politi-
cians (in Souza’s case). We addressed the reduced represen-
tation of Black women in Brazilian politics and analyzed 
the complexities entailed in their achieving media visibility. 
The article deliberately focused on Souza’s story. Obtaining 
further data about Black women politicians and analyzing 
the data in cross-cultural contexts could provide an inter-
esting future avenue. Additionally, further research needs 
to be conducted with social media companies, media regu-
lators, and members of the judicial system. 
In the current Brazilian legal and political contexts, the 
president has become known for making public statements 
that offend and demean women and people of color. The 
governor has loudly voiced that public safety issues in Rio 
have a simple solution: shooting people in the head. Ad-
ditionally, as we observed in comments to Souza’s tweet, 
defending human rights has become synonymous with de-
fending criminals. Therefore, is it realistic to expect state-
driven initiatives for promoting diversity and digital liter-
acy? It is not surprising to conclude that regulation via an 
authoritarian state or internet companies is unlikely to of-
fer protection to women of color. Here, we identify link vis-
ibility as a protection mechanism that stems from Black 
women who are disproportionately affected by hatred and 
violence online. We suggest that link visibility, in the 
Brazilian context, can become part of a wider global abo-
litionist movement in the age of big data. We echo Ben-
jamin’s views on the urgency for 
a growing movement toward divesting resources from 
policing and prisons and reinvesting in education, em-
ployment, mental health, and a broader support system 
needed to cultivate safe and thriving communities. 
Calls for abolition are never simply about bringing 
harmful systems to an end but also about envisioning 
new ones. After all, the etymology of “abolition” in-
cludes Latin root words for “destroy” (abolere) and 
“grow” (olere). (2019, 111) 
In this way, link visibility derives from the creation of 
collective “lugares de fala,” or loci of enunciation (Ribeiro 
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2017), with Black women connecting their visibilities online 
for protection and emancipation purposes. Here, as we sug-
gested, processes of link visibility can build bridges between 
Black women online and other social actors, in Brazil and 
elsewhere, strengthening collective efforts to fight misog-
yny, racism, and the surveillance of Blackness (Browne 
2015). To engage in link visibility, Black women and their 
allies adopt intersectional lenses that enable them to see 
the complexities entailed in multiple layers of oppression. 
We argue that link visibility processes represent steps to-
ward futures of solidarity. We have shared experiences of 
how Black female politicians can manage their visibility 
crises (Medrado and Rega, forthcoming), engaging with tra-
ditional media and with intersectional feminist networked 
movements on social media. Hopefully, this framework can 
help others who find themselves equally vulnerable online. 
In this way, connecting this framework to Costanza-Chock’s 
work on “design justice,” we take an ethical stand in sys-
tematically advancing “the participation of marginalized 
communities in all stages of the technology design process; 
through this process, resources and power can be more eq-
uitably distributed” (2020, 117). 
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